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1961]

RECENT CASES

and which is followed by the majority of jurisdictions appears to
be the most reasonable.
ROBERT P. GUST
INTOXICATING

LIQUORS

-

LiCENSES -

IS A LIQUOR LICENSE PRO-

as executor of decedent's estate,
requested the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board to transfer the
PERTY OR A PRIVILEGE? -Plaintiff,

decedent's liquor license in accordance with his testamentary direc-

tions.' The Commonwealth included the value of this right to apply
for a transfer of decedent's liquor license as part of decedent's
personal estate in an appraisement for inheritance tax purposes.
Upon the Commonwealth's appeal from the Trial Court's decision,
holding such value non-taxable, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
overruling a previous decision,- held, with one justice dissenting,
that the value of the right to apply for a transfer of the license is a
property right, subject to inclusion as an asset of the estate for inheritance tax purposes. In re Estate of Feitz, 167 A.2d 504 (Pa.
1961).
The general law is well settled that a liquor license is neither
property nor a contract right; 3 but only a purely personal priviledge
for a specific limited time. 4 Although often valuable, it is not
transferrable without permission of the granting board, 5 nor does

it go to the personal representative or become an asset of the
holder's estate in case of death.6 However, it may have the qualities
of property,7 or it may be placed in the category of property where
the question concerns the rights of the licensee's creditors or
personal representative, and then only when it has been expressly
made transferrable by legislative enactment.8
1. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, § 4-468 (1951).
"Except in cases of emergency
transfers of licenses may be made only at times fixed by the board. In the case of the
death of a licensee, the board may transfer the license to the surviving spouse or personal
representative or to a person designated by him."
2. In re Ryan's Estate, 375 Pa. 42, 99 A.2d 562 (1953).
Here the value of the
license and the value of the right to apply for a transfer thereof were not taxable.
3.
State v. Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, 246 Ala. 198, 19 So. 2d 84.1
(1944); Owens v. Rutherford, 200 Ga. 143, 36 S.E.2d 309 (1945); Walker v. City of,
Clinton, 244 Ia. 1099, 59 N.W.2d 785 (1953).
4. In re Bay Ridge Inn,, 94 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1938); People v. Harrison, 256 Ill.
102, 99 N.E. 903 (1912); Fredrico v. Braaten, 181 Md. 507, 30 A.2d 776 (1943).
5. Wood v. School Dist. No. 32, 80 Neb. 722, 115 N.W. 308 (1908); United States
Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. Little, 76 N.H. 427, 83 Atl. 513 (1912); Rawlins v. Trevethan, 139 N.J.L. 226, 50 A.2d 852 (1947); Barth v. Brandy, 165 Wis. 196, 161 N.W.

766 (1917).
6. Kosco v. Hackmeister, Inc., 396 Pa. 288, 152 A.2d 673 (1959).
7. Midwest Beverage Co. v. Gates, 61 F.Supp. 688 (N.D. Ind. 1945). The use of
the permit, once granted, has the elements of property irrespective of what the legislature
may declare about the permit itself. Kline v. State Beverage Department of Florida, 77
So. 2d 872 (Fla. 1955); Stone v. Farish. 199 Miss. 186. 23 So. 2d 911 (1945).
8. Duncan v. Truman, 74 Ariz. 328, 248 P.2d 879 (1952); State v. Superior Court
of Marion County, 233 Ind. 563, 122 N.E.2d 9 (1954).
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Two types of legislative enactments are readily apparent. The
first type, found in the majority of jurisdictions, is a restrictive
statute holding that a liquor license is not transferable. In jurisdictions such as these it is generally held that the death of a
licensee terminates the license. It therefore does not become an
asset of the estate" or give the personal representative of the
licensee any right to conduct the business or to make sales under
the license," nor can he exercise the priviledge of obtaining a

renewal, which could have been invoked by the decedent had he
lived." The second type of enactment, the statutes in a minority of
states, 13 are such that a liquor license is regarded as a valuable
property right.' 4 Where so regarded, it is an asset of the estate of
the licensee which passes to the trustee in bankruptcy," or, in case
of the licensee's death, to his personal representative, 6 and can be
transferred only to persons meeting the requirements of the
statute. 7 This license, when assignable, is also property subject to
levy, or sale upon execution.' As property, it has been held too
incorporeal to be the object of a personal property tax.' 9

Although there are no ,cases discussing transferability under
North Dakota's statute, -° it appears, in the light of Smith v. City

9. An example of such an enactment is: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 53-149 (1953). "A license
shall be purely a personal privilege good for not to exceed one year after issuance . . . nor
shall it be subject to attachment, garnishment, or execution, nor shall it be alienable or
transferable, voluntarily or involuntarily . . . Such license shall not descend by the
laws of testate or intestate devolution, but shall cease upon the death of the licensee."
10.
In re Harris, 15 Alaska 250 (1954); see Light v. Zeiter, 124 Mont. 67, 219 P.2d
295 (1950); In re Buck's Estate, 185 Pa. 57, 39 Atl. 821 (1898).
11. Hartingh v. Bay Circuit Judge, 176 Mich. 289, 142 N.W. 585 (1913); Wood v.
School Dist. No. 32, 80 Neb. 722, 115 N.W. 308 (1908).
12. Hartingh v. Bay Circuit Judge, 176 Mich. 289, 142 N.W. 585 (1913).
13. An example of such an enactment is: Cal. Code Ann. § 24071 (West 1953). "The
license or licenses of one spouse may be transferred to the other . . .and the license or
licenses of a decedent, minor, ward, incomptent person, bankrupt person, person for whose
estate a receiver is appointed or assignor for benefit of creditors may be transferred by or
to the surviving partner . . . of deceased licensee, the executor, administrator, or guardian
of an estate of a licensee, the surviving spouse."
14. Etchart v. Pyles, 106 Cal. App. 2d 549, 235 P.2d 427 (1951); House v. Cotton.
52 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1951); Deggender v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., 41 Wash. 385,
83 Pac. 898 (1906).
15. In re Quaker Room, 90 F.Supp. 758 (S.D. Cal. 1950); Fisher v. Cushman, 103
Fed. 860 (1st Cir. 1900).
16.
In re Quaker Room, supra.; Roehm v. Orange County, 32 Cal. App. 2d 280, 196
P.2d 550 (1948); Hartingh v. Bay Circuit Judge, 176 Mich. 289, 142 N.W. 585 (1913).
17. Baltimore Retail Liquor P. Stores Ass'n v. Kerngood, 171 Md. 426, 189 Atl. 209
(1937).
18. Rowe v. Colpoys, 137 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1943); In re Fuetl, 247 Fed. 829
(D.C. Conn. 1917).
19.
Roehm v. Orange County, 32 Cal. App. 2d 280, 196 P.2d 550 (1948); Harding
v. Board of Equalization, 90 Neb. 232, 133 N.W. 191 (1911).
20. N.D. Cent. Code § 5-03-02 (1961). "The license fees shall be the same to each
individual within each of the said political subdivisions respectively, and a license shall
not be transferrable, except to the executors or administrators of a deceased license holder."
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of LaMoure,21 that North Dakota would follow the majority in construing a liquor license as a personal priviledge.
It is submitted that today, through legislative fiat, the tendency
is to involve the nature of the right in confusion by designating a
license a property right for one purpose and a priviledge for
another. As a result the courts are going to find that they will have
to go farther in solving the problem, and until they do, the apparent
inconsistencies and obvious confusion will continue to plague the
minds of intelligent men.
JAY MYSTER

JURY -

BIAS AND PREJUDICE -

AS PROPER SUBJECT OF INQUIRY IN

Voir Dire EXAMINATION - The defendant was convicted of dynamiting a public school building in the city of Little Rock. In the
course of the voir dire examination, the trial court refused to allow
the defense counsel to ask the veniremen, "Are you a segregationist
or an integrationist?" On appeal the Supreme Court of Arkansas
in affirming the conviction, held, two justices dissenting, that the
trial judge did not abuse his discretion in disallowing the question,
which had no bearing on the acceptability of a juror trying a man
for dynamiting a building, and which would be more confusing
than helpful in determining a juror's fitness. The dissent argued
that because of the common knowledge that the school was
dynamited to prevent integration, the question would be necessary
in order for the defense to ascertain possible bias and intelligently
exercise peremptory challenges. Lauderdale v. State, 343 S.W.2d
422 (Ark. 1961).
A form of voir dire examination to lay basis for challenge is
considered necessary to secure an impartial jury.1 Questions have
been considered acceptable even when they could not possibly
lead to grounds for challenge for cause, but were simply to enable
2
counsel to more intelligently utilize his peremptory challenges.
Bias is intimately related to the purpose of voir dire.' Potential
4
jurors may be examined as to their membership in political,
21.

77 N.D. 658, 44 N.W.2d 789 (1950).

1. Leach v. State, 31 Ala. App. 390, 18 So. 2d 285 (1944); Gurley v. State, 164
Ark. 397, 262 S.W. 636 (1924); People v. Lobb, 17 Il. 2d 287, 161 N.E.2d 325 (1959).
2. Rose v. Magio, 220 Ala. 120, 124 So. 296 (1929); State v. Miller, 60 Idaho 79,
88 P.2d 526 (1939); People v. De Lordo, 350 Ill. 148, 182 N.E. 726 (1932); but see,
McGee v. State, 219 Md. 53, 146 A.2d 194 (1950).
3. "Durham .v. State, 182 Tenn. 577, 188 S.W.2d 555 (1945); Murphy v. State, 72
Okla. Crim. 1, 112 P.2d 438 (1941) (dictum).
4.
United States v. Kertess, 139 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1944).

